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We build on the social heuristics hypothesis, the literature on the glucose model of self-
control, and recent challenges on these hypotheses to investigate whether individuals
exhibit a change in degree of trust and reciprocation after consumption of a meal. We
induce short-term manipulation of hunger followed by the trust game and a decision
on whether to leave personal belongings in an unlocked and unsupervised room. Our
results are inconclusive. While, we report hungry individuals trusting and reciprocating
more than those who have just consumed a meal in a high trust society, we fail to
reject the null with small number of observations (N = 101) and experimental sessions
(N = 8). In addition, we find no evidence of short-term hunger having an impact on
charitable giving or decisions in public good game.
Keywords: trust, reciprocity, trustworthiness, hunger, glucose, social heuristics hypothesis
INTRODUCTION
Trust has been the grease in the wheels of historical and modern societies. Trust promotes
economic growth, organizational efficiency, and innovation. The level of trust depends on beliefs
about trustworthiness–individuals trust more if they believe their counterpart is trustworthy
(Fehr, 2009). If individuals expect not to be cheated on and act accordingly, trading partners,
acquaintances, or strangers can transact more smoothly with each other without the need of an
explicit enforcement mechanism for every single contract.
The origins of trust can be investigated from several perspectives. One perspective is the
environment an individual is exposed to. Environmental factors contributing to the choice of
whether to trust include experiences (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011;
Peysakhovich and Rand, 2016), culture (Guiso et al., 2009; Bohnet et al., 2010), institutions (Algan
and Cahuc, 2010; Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011), and even physical appearance (Duarte et al.,
2012). The environment and individual lives in, and the clues on the trustworthiness of others she
picks up, are important determinants of trust.
While determinants of trust can be attributed to the environment an individual is exposed to,
biology provides another perspective. Trust and trustworthiness both have a genetic component
(Cesarini et al., 2008; Riedl and Javor, 2012), they are affected by hormones (Kosfeld et al., 2005;
Zak et al., 2005), and can be traced to distinct brain areas in functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) representing fear of deception, anticipation of long-term benefits, mentalizing and
rewarding experiences of being trusted (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011).
An important everyday biological process, hunger, has been until now virtually ignored in
research for trust and reciprocity. However, empirical evidence on visceral factors mitigating or
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inhibiting trust is so far limited to physical temperature and
sleep deprivation. Higher temperature has been associated with
increased trust in others and prosociality in some studies
(Williams and Bargh, 2008; Kang et al., 2011; although the results
of the former study failed to replicate in Lynott et al., 2014).
In contrast, after 36-h total sleep deprivation individual are less
likely to place trust on others (Anderson and Dickinson, 2010;
Dickinson and McElroy, 2017).
We contribute to this limited body of knowledge on the role
of visceral factors in decision making by investigating how trust
and trustworthiness are influenced by an everyday visceral factor,
short-term hunger1. We concentrate on short-term hunger in this
study since it is societally important: most individuals experience
it every day. Furthermore, short-term hunger is generally not
considered an issue that needs to be urgently addressed. To our
knowledge, we are the first to empirically investigate whether
short-term hunger influences trust and trustworthiness.
Trust is highly context-dependent and varies between
countries, ethnicities, and institutions individuals are exposed
to (Fehr, 2009). According to the social heuristics hypothesis
(SHH, first version in Rand et al., 2012), beneficial social
behaviors become internalized as default heuristics that impact
and guide behavior reasonably automatically (Rand et al., 2014;
Peysakhovich and Rand, 2016). Trusting in a high trust society
can for instance be the intuitive behavioral response. In this
paper, we particularly concentrate on short-term hunger in
a high-trust society. Finland, where our data originate from,
consistently ranks very high in interpersonal trust according to
the World Values Survey placing third in the fifth wave of the
survey.
To study whether short-term hunger influences trust and
trustworthiness we observe choice behavior in a laboratory.
Similar to recent work in social sciences (see Coleman, 1990;
Fehr, 2009), we collect data on trust and trustworthiness behavior
using the trust game (Berg et al., 1995) and by observing whether
an individual leaves belongings in an unlocked and unsupervised
laboratory room. In the laboratory, we compare decisions by
sated healthy Finnish subjects after consuming breakfast with
decisions by subjects consuming only water.
We offer two contributions to the literature. First, this study is
the first that links short-term hunger with trusting and reciprocal
behavior. While low blood glucose levels or short-term hunger
have been previously linked in resource depletion models with
decisions requiring self-control (Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007;
Kuhn et al., 2017), risk taking (Symmonds et al., 2010; de Ridder
et al., 2014), intertemporal choice (Wang and Dvorak, 2010), and
political views (Petersen et al., 2014), scholars have not yet linked
short-term hunger with individual trust and trustworthiness.
1We use the qualifying term “short-term” for hunger to mark a distinction between
short-term craving of food (defined as “an uneasy sensation occasioned by the
lack of food” by Merriam-Webster online dictionary) and chronic malnutrition
(“a weakened condition brought about by prolonged lack of food”). The definition
of hunger “has historically been used to describe a biological state of acute energy
deprivation or subjective state presumably reflecting an actual or impending state
of energy deprivation” (e.g., Lowe and Butryn, 2007). In this paper, we consider
subjects who are deprived of breakfast to experience short-term hunger. We verify
this deprivation empirically by using blood-glucose concentration measurement
and subjective feeling of hunger using visual analog scale (VAS).
Second, although we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect,
the results would not be inconsistent with the claim that hunger
leads to more trusting and strategic behavior. The literature so
far generally associates low blood glucose levels or short-term
hunger with heightened greed (e.g., Briers et al., 2006; Gailliot
and Baumeister, 2007), but recent evidence (de Ridder et al.,
2014) also indicates that hungry individuals may be more capable
of making strategic decisions. This is consistent with the notion
from the recent literature pointing out that decision environment
may have unanticipated effect direction and mechanism than
suggested by the resource depletion models (Kuhn et al., 2017).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we
introduce hypotheses for trust and trustworthiness. Section
“Short-Term Hunger, Trustworthiness, and Trust in the
Laboratory” presents results from an empirical study and Section
“Conclusion” concludes.
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Trusting and reciprocating by being trustworthy are intertwined
and correlated with cooperative behavior in general, such as
altruism and cooperation in the public good game (PGG;
Peysakhovich et al., 2014). In an environment in which
agents are trustworthy and are expected to reciprocate,
trustworthiness promotes a cycle of mutual trust. However,
trust and trustworthiness have important conceptual differences.
Trusting is an act of the sender voluntarily placing resources at
the disposal of the trustee without any legal commitment from
the latter (some authors dub as “strategic cooperation”, see e.g.,
Rand, 2016). The act of trust is generally associated with an
expectation that the act will pay off in terms of the investor’s
goals (Fehr, 2009), although this notion has been challenged in
the more recent literature (Espín et al., 2016). In a one-shot game,
trusting behavior may be regarded as self-interested, strategic
behavior if the opponent reciprocates with high enough of a
probability of making the investment worthwhile (Bohnet and
Zeckhauser, 2004). In contrast, returning a favor by being a
trustworthy second mover in a one-shot trust game is prosocial
behavior through an act of positive reciprocity and cannot be
explained by purely selfish motives (Sanfey, 2007; dubbed as
“pure cooperation” in Rand, 2016). As a result, we also use the
terms trustworthiness and reciprocity interchangeably.
Drawing from previous literature, it is possible to posit two
opposite predictions on the relationship between short-term
hunger, trust, and trustworthiness. Based on recent controversies
in the literature, it is also possible that short-term hunger has no
impact on trust or trustworthiness, or that results may be highly
context-dependent. We discuss all these possibilities below.
Hunger Increases Trust and
Trustworthiness (HA1)
Since deviation from an intuitive choice requires energy and
behavioral control (Fairclough and Houston, 2004), we construct
our first alternative hypothesis by considering trusting and
trustworthiness as automated behavior. We argue that if an
individual experiences short-term hunger, he or she would be
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more inclined to use less cognitive control and rely on the
automated behaviors.
Some of the recent developments [described in Zaki and
Mitchell (2013); also referred to as social heuristics hypothesis, or
SHH, by Rand et al. (2013, 2014), Rand (2016), formalized in Bear
and Rand (2016) and Bear et al. (2017)] on prosociality suggest
that prosocial behaviors are automated and intuitive, although
not always for all people. Individuals act more prosocially in
experiments priming for the use of intuitive reasoning through
time pressure and constrained ability to exert control. Bear and
Rand (2016) as well as Bear et al. (2017) formalize this argument
in their models by setting a cost, d, of exerting deliberation
over intuition. Deliberation only pays off if the benefits of
deliberation exceed a threshold T. Hence, as long as payoffs
are small and costs of cognitive processing exceed potential
gains, individuals cooperate intuitively if they come from an
environment where cooperation is an equilibrium strategy. In
addition, the argument by Rand (2016) would strengthen the
expectation of observing increasing trust and trustworthiness in
hungry individuals. Trusting involves future consequences and
thus an impairment of cognitive processing such as induction of
short-term hunger should increase trust and trustworthiness.
Preference for prosociality and fair sharing of resources may
extend to the behavior of non-human primates (Brosnan and
de Waal, 2003; former study contested in Roma et al., 2006)
and the presence of other humans or human like features such
as eyes accentuates prosociality in choices even in the absence
of reciprocal social gratification (Burnham and Hare, 2007).
These findings also corroborate the argument of prosocial and
reciprocal behavior as intuitive, automated behavior. If short-
term hunger induces individuals in the laboratory to resort to the
automated behavior, they may be intuitively inclined to trust and
reciprocate more than sated individuals who have more energy
reserves to engage in controlled and effortful processes.
Recent developments in SHH (Rand, 2016) have made a
distinction between strategic (such as trusting) and pure (such
as reciprocating) cooperation. This line of thought argues that
for strategic cooperation, inducing cognitive impairment would
not have an impact as for pure cooperation. We would hence
expect a stronger impact on trustworthiness than trust (if any)
in the laboratory, because trusting induces no cognitive conflict
if trusting is purely strategic behavior. However, there still may
be a positive impact on trust, especially if relying on the early,
more broad version of SHH (Rand et al., 2012) which does
not incorporate cognitive conflict. In addition, trusting may be
strategic, but it does no have to be strategic for all individuals.
Hunger Decreases Trust and
Trustworthiness (HA2)
It is possible to argue that hunger decreases trust and
trustworthiness using three different lines of thought in our
second alternative hypothesis. The first line of thought would
use similar argumentation as above but with the opposite
conclusion: not trusting or reciprocating is the default response
and cognitive impairment such as short-term hunger would tilt
toward less trusting and reciprocating behavior. The second line
of thought draws from literature associating low blood glucose
with heightened greed and impulsiveness. The third line of
thought comes from evolutionary psychology.
Some scholars argue that prosocial behaviors are not
automatic but trusting and reciprocating require cognitive
effort. The proponents of the reflective model (e.g., Moore
and Loewenstein, 2004; DeWall et al., 2008; Steinbeis et al.,
2012; defined in Zaki and Mitchell, 2013) argue that humans
act prosocially by suppressing the urge to act selfishly. This
suppression requires energy and hence hungry individuals with
reduced energy levels would be less likely to act prosocially.
The expectation that not trusting is the default choice stems
for instance from the literature on human development which
suggests that not trusting others is the hard-wired standard
response present in childhood. This tendency diminishes with
experience: trusting behavior increases throughout childhood,
and remains at a reasonably steady level in adulthood (Sutter and
Kocher, 2007; van den Bos et al., 2010). Rand et al. (2014) make a
related argument in laboratory: individuals with more laboratory
experience cooperate less in one-shot experiments. This suggests
that even if trusting and reciprocity are default choices at birth,
individuals may update their priors based on experience and not
trust and reciprocate as a default.
Low blood glucose levels have been associated with heightened
greed, such as decreased self-control, impulse inhibition, and
greater discounting of the future (e.g., Briers et al., 2006; Muraven
et al., 2006; Gailliot et al., 2007; Hagger et al., 2010; Symmonds
et al., 2010; Wang and Dvorak, 2010). Heightened greed and
decreased self-control thus leave more room for selfish urges
when individuals are hungry.
Some authors arrive at the same conclusion using
argumentation from evolutionary psychology. Low blood
glucose levels are linked to changes in behavior consistent
with promoting strategies fit for survival. Increased risk-taking
(Symmonds et al., 2010; Wang and Dvorak, 2010) and more
impulsive behavior driven by lower self-control (e.g., Read and
van Leeuwen, 1998; Gailliot and Baumeister, 2007) have been
linked to depletion of energy resources in the body to promote
more aggressive and risk-taking foraging strategies. Even the
classic Maslow (1943) need hierarchy model would indicate
that individuals subject to primary physiological needs such as
hunger would prioritize immediate food acquisition (1st level
of the hierarchy) to more future-oriented reciprocal behavior
(2nd level in the need hierarchy) requiring self-control and
risk-tolerance.
In conclusion, from these three arguments we could posit that
increasing short-term hunger would lead to decreased trust and
trustworthiness.
Hunger Changes Trust and
Trustworthiness Depending on Context
(HA3)
Based on the discussion above, it is possible to posit trusting
and trustworthiness either as automated or controlled process.
This discrepancy could be explained by the fact that trust
is highly context-dependent and varies between countries,
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ethnicities, and institutions individuals are exposed to (Fehr,
2009). Another argument leading to same conclusion leans on
different types of social cooperation. A recent meta study by Rand
(2016) argues that for pure cooperation, such as reciprocation
in the trust game, deliberation reduces cooperation. Hence,
cooperation with few future consequences (such as being the
receiver in a one shot trust game) of one’s actions would
be impaired by manipulation increasing the cost of cognitive
processing.
Our experiments take place in Finland, which is a high-trust
society. It consistently ranks very high in interpersonal trust
according to the World Values Survey placing third in the fifth
wave of the survey. Trusting and reciprocating with a stranger
is the social norm in Finland similar to other Nordic countries
(Brandt and Svendsen, 2010). According to the SHH (Rand et al.,
2014; Peysakhovich and Rand, 2016), we would expect hungry
individuals to trust and reciprocate with their counterparts more
in the laboratory. This is because the society reinforce trusting
behavior strongly so that trust and reciprocating have evolved to
be intuitive choices and also a strategically sound decisions in our
participant pool.
Hunger Has No Impact on Trust and
Trustworthiness (HNull)
It is also entirely possible that short-term hunger manipulation
does not change trusting and reciprocal behavior. This is the
case if (a) there is no generalizable baseline in prosocial behavior
(individuals have no default in trusting and reciprocating
behavior) which would be influenced by cognitive load
manipulation (such as short-term hunger manipulation), (b)
short-term hunger manipulation has no impact on trust and
trustworthiness, or a combination of (a) and (b).
For (a), the jury is still out as the literature on SHH is currently
under controversy. Tinghög et al. (2013) fail to replicate the
highly influential original study on SHH by Rand et al. (2012)
reporting individuals who reach decisions faster to be more
cooperative and thus predisposed to cooperation. Verkoeijen and
Bouwmeester (2014) report evidence inconsistent with the SHH.
Furthermore, Bouwmeester et al. (2017) also fail to replicate the
Rand et al. (2012) result in a multilab setting.
For (b), scholars have recently proposed that blood glucose
levels may not have an impact on behavior. Resource depletion
through lower blood glucose level may not lead to lower self-
control and thus more likely default response. Vadillo et al. (2016)
challenge earlier studies linking glucose and self-control and
present evidence on publication bias in this stream of literature.
Lange and Eggert (2014) do not find evidence on lower glucose
having a detrimental impact on self-control. Furthermore,
Kurzban (2010) dissects the theoretical argumentation of the
glucose model concluding that empirical evidence consistent
with glucose not being a resource to willpower, but may be
an input to the decision-making process. Some studies using
cognitive load manipulation other than glucose report findings
consistent with the idea that prosocial behavior is not influenced
by cognitive load (Kessler and Meier, 2014; Mieth et al., 2016).
On a higher conceptual level, these findings together with failed
replications (Hagger et al., 2016) challenge the ego depletion
model of self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al.,
1998).
In sum, the recently accumulated evidence on (a) and (b)
cast doubt on the social heuristics hypothesis, at least in its
original form (Rand et al., 2012) and the glucose model of
self- control. Hence, based on the previous literature, it is
also entirely possible that cognitive load manipulation through
short-term hunger does not have an impact on trust and
trustworthiness.
SHORT-TERM HUNGER,
TRUSTWORTHINESS, AND TRUST IN
THE LABORATORY
Short-Term Hunger, Trustworthiness, and
Trust in Trust Game
Method
We recruited 101 participants (or subjects) from the University of
Turku Public Choice Research Centre (PCRC) participant pool to
participate in the study. We had a between-subjects single-blind
incentivized (10 EUR show up plus up to 10 EUR performance
fee) experimental design using four randomly assigned groups on
four days with treatment (“sated condition”) consuming a meal
and four groups on four days with control condition (“hungry
condition”) consuming only water before the experiment.
We did not have any reliable guidance on previous literature
on expected effect sizes. Furthermore, the experimental setup was
also rather invasive (adherence to an overnight fast and two blood
glucose measurements). As a result, we recruited all participants
we could from the participant pool, did not perform ex ante
power calculations, and as a result any statistically insignificant
results may be uninformative about the true effect. We outline
the experimental procedure below and complete details of the
laboratory experiment are given in Appendices A–C.
We requested all participants to adhere to an overnight fast
in our call for participation and reminder sent 24 h before the
laboratory session. Participants were informed about serving of a
meal on the call for participation and the reminder, but they did
not know the exact timing of the meal.
After arriving at the laboratory at 09:30 AM in each session,
all participants completed pre-treatment measurements. First,
they rated their hunger and satiety-related sensations (hunger,
fullness, satiety, desire to eat, and prospective consumption) and
thirst using 10 cm visual analog scales (VAS, see Blundell et al.,
2010 and Appendix B1). Then, for verifying adherence to 10-
h fast, an experienced nurse measured capillary blood glucose
concentrations after which the participants were served either a
meal (treatment group) or water (control group).
As our experimental manipulation intends to capture the
effect of an experienced short-term hunger rather than a peak in
glucose concentration, we decided to use a balanced meal to make
the setting a more natural breakfast versus a skipped breakfast
comparison. The meal consisted of a cheese sandwich, yogurt,
and orange juice with an average energy content of 521 kcal
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(2190 kJ) per serving.2 Participants in the treatment condition
were offered a meal before any post-treatment measurements
while participants in the control condition were offered initially
only water and a meal after all post-treatment measurements
were completed.
We randomized at the session level and thus all participants
in the same session were under the same experimental condition.
When using conservative baseline metrics in the Section “Results
and Discussion”, we assume observations are clustered within
session. We also report results when relaxing this assumption.
After consuming a meal or water, the participants completed
a survey with a questionnaire related to another study, a
control questionnaire on emotional valence, and a second
VAS-assessment at the end of the survey (Appendix B2). The
nurse measured blood glucose concentrations for the second time
after approximately 10 min after finishing the meal or drinking
water. Next, the experimenter asked participants to proceed to the
second laboratory room and casually mentioned “you can leave
your belongings such as jackets and bags here or take them with
you, it is entirely up to you.” This is a hidden experiment for an
additional investigation of trust using the same participants.
We included the trust game with a multiplier of 3 and
direct response method (see Appendix A1 and Berg et al.,
1995 for details) as a part of the laboratory session in the
second laboratory room (screenshots are given in Appendix C).
The individuals completed the trust game first, followed by a
prisoner’s dilemma (PD), a public goods game, and two dictator
games with charitable giving to external recipients (for summary
descriptions of all games, see Levitt and List, 2007). We used
2The meal provided 76 g carbohydrates (59% of total energy, E%), 17 g
(28E%) fat and 16 g (12E%) protein. The energy and nutrient content of the
sandwich was calculated using the Finnish Food Composition Database Fineli R©
(http://fineli.fi/index.php?lang=en). For the yogurt and juice, we used the energy
content information given by the manufacturers. Apart from random variation
in meal serving sizes, the energy content of the meal did not vary between
participants.
additional games to avoid replicating the rather expensive and
somewhat invasive laboratory session in case requested by the
scientific community. We did not hypothesize ex ante on these
games, but decided to include them to not have to redo rather
time-consuming, invasive, and expensive laboratory sessions in
case requested by the research community. Our reasoning proved
to have some merit ex post, as in fall 2015 we calculated an
aggregate metric for pure cooperation to be included as a part
of meta-study by Rand (2016)3.
Subjects completed three rounds of each game. We used
experimental currency units (ECUs) in the experiment with
ten ECUs corresponding to 1 EUR and the experiment was
programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
Similar to Schotter et al. (1994), we were concerned about
subjects not perceiving the trust game as a strictly one-off
problem and either learning or establishing a norm of future
play through their own actions. To alleviate such concerns,
we randomized the counterparts and roles (with replacement)
in each round to induce participants to consider each round
and decision strictly as a one-off decision and limited the
number of standard trust game rounds to three with a randomly
3A reader worried about post hoc hypothesizing (see e.g., Kerr, 1998) may be
comforted by the fact that in a grant application submitted to KAUTE Foundation
on February 14, 2014 and our research proposal submitted to Aalto University
Research Ethics Committee on March 6, 2014 we unambiguously state that we
will study the relationship between short-term hunger and trust and do not
hypothesize on other outcome variables. Furthermore, we also explicitly chose to
have participants to complete the trust game first and included hidden experiment
to collect further data on trust. Planning to include hidden experiment in our
analysis can be confirmed by Appendix 1 of our proposal to Aalto University
Research Ethics Committee. Both documents are in Finnish and available upon
request from the corresponding author.
Our logic proved to have merit ex post. Rand (2016) reports results that we did not
include in the earlier versions of the manuscript, but were provided to the meta-
analysis of Rand (2016) by the authors. In addition, during the review process a
referee requested us to add the results for other games in Section “Results for Other
Games”.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for treatment (sated) and control (hungry) conditions.
Min Mean Median Max SD N
Indicator: male Hungry 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.43 49
Sated 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.44 52
Year of birth Hungry 1972 1987 1988 1994 4.59 49
Sated 1974 1988 1989 1994 4.36 52
Indicator: student Hungry 0.00 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.50 49
Sated 0.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.49 52
BMI (kg/m2) Hungry 17.37 23.39 22.76 39.18 3.97 49
Sated 16.73 23.53 22.50 46.25 4.54 52
Pre-treatment glucose (mmol/L) Hungry 4.00 5.02 5.00 6.20 0.55 49
Sated 3.90 5.01 5.00 7.20 0.62 52
Post-treatment glucose (mmol/L) Hungry 3.50 4.84 4.80 6.70 0.75 49
Sated 4.70 6.78 6.70 9.40 1.16 52
Group size Hungry 8.00 14.37 14 20.00 5.11 49
Sated 6.00 15.85 18 20.00 5.43 52
This table reports descriptive statistics for individuals in the control (hungry) and treatment (sated) condition. Body mass index (BMI) is based on self-reported weight and
height.
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FIGURE 1 | Box plots from Visual Analog Scale questions for control (hungry) and treatment (sated) conditions. The box indicates middle quartiles and white line
denotes median. Bar widths show the range and dots show outlying observations. N = 101 (49 in the hungry condition and 52 in the sated condition). Values in
y-axis are centimeters.
chosen counterpart and role (sender or trustee) redrawn with
replacement each round. Each participant would thus play a
randomly assigned number (0–3) of rounds of the trust game as a
sender and the remaining rounds as a receiver in the trust game.
In PD game, players have to decide whether to cooperate or
defect. Players will achieve highest combined payoff (3 ECUs to
both) by cooperating, but a player has always an incentive to
cheat for a higher payoff. In case the other player cooperates, the
defector gets 5 ECUs and the cooperator gets nothing. In case
both players defect, the payoffs are 1 ECU to both players.
In PGG, both players receive 4 ECUs which they can partially
or wholly contribute to common pool, which is increased by 50%
by the experimenter and equally shared between participants. We
use pairwise iteration so players will learn the outcome of the
other player at the end of each round. Similar to PD, both players
have an incentive to defect by not contributing to common
pool.
Same as for the trust game, we randomized counterpart at
the beginning for PD and PGG at each round and each game to
induce strictly one-shot decision frames. The participants were
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FIGURE 2 | Distribution of back transfers from the trustee in the trust game
reported separately for treatment (sated) and control (hungry) conditions.
N = 130 (Nsated = 66, Nhungry = 64).
also informed about the randomization in the verbal and written
briefing (Appendix A3) prior to the experiment.
Two dictator games were used with charitable giving framing.
The participants were allocated additional 5 ECUs that they
could donate wholly or partially to the New Children’s Hospital
2017 project and a further 5 ECUs to be potentially donated
to the Finnish Red Cross Disaster Relief Fund. After the two
dictator games, new round would begin or at the end of
third round the participant would be forwarded to a short
survey including demographic questions (year of birth and
gender), height, weight, and a question on leaving personal
belongings in the first laboratory room. All participants were
told after the survey that the experiment had been finished
now and that they would be paid in an adjacent room. Finally,
participants in the control condition were offered a meal after the
survey.
Results for the Trust Game
Out of 101 participants, 60 are students and 76 females4. Table 1
shows that gender, birth year, student indicator, and BMI are
very similar across conditions implying participants did not
incidentally cluster across demographics or physical qualities.
They are on average 26 years old (born in 1988), and have
an average BMI of 23.5 kg/m2. Furthermore, Table 1 also
shows that sated and hungry conditions have almost identical
pre-treatment blood glucose concentration levels (5.02 mmol/L
in hungry versus 5.01 mmol/L for sated condition, Eskelinen
(2012) reports a reference level range of 4.0–6.0 mmol/L).
The post-treatment blood glucose concentrations were slightly
lower among the control condition subjects who were offered
only water (4.84 mmol/L, not statistically significantly different
from pre-treatment value) whereas the treatment condition
subjects receiving food showed an increase to 6.78 mmol/L,
which is a typical post-digestion level verifying that the meals
4The large fraction of females in the study is most likely attributable to the
proximity of the PCRC lab with the faculty of Humanities, where 72% of the
student body comprised of females when this study was done.
were consumed. The difference in post-treatment glucose
level between treatment and control conditions is statistically
significant with p < 0.001 in a two-tailed t-test of means.
Boxplots in Figure 1 for VAS-measurements also confirm that
the participants felt hungry when arriving at the experiment.
None of the results for pre-treatment VAS-measurements
significantly differ between treatment and control conditions.
In contrast, post-treatment differences in self-reported hunger-
and satiety-related sensations are all significantly different
(two-tailed t-test of means, p < 0.001) between treatment
and control conditions. However, thirst levels shown in
Figure 1 are statistically indistinguishable across treatment
and control conditions. We conclude that the treatment and
control conditions were statistically indistinguishable from each
other on pre-treatment blood glucose concentration levels and
hunger- and satiety-related sensations. After treatment, the sated
treatment group reported a significant decrease in hunger and
this could be verified from their blood glucose concentration.
TABLE 2 | Back transfers in the trust game.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on trust experiment, absolute back transfer
(N = 130 back transfer decisions)
Hungry
condition
Sated
condition
Mean of back transfer (ECU) 4.17 2.89
Median of back transfer (ECU) 4.00 2.50
Standard deviation of back transfers (ECU) 3.17 2.47
Number of observations 64 66
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on trust experiment, relative back transfer
(%) (N = 130 back transfer decisions)
Hungry
condition
Sated
condition
Mean average back transfer (%) 142.58 109.97
Median average back transfer (%) 150.00 100.00
Standard deviation of back transfers (%) 87.67 78.78
Number of observations 64 66
Panel C: Mann–Whitney U test for difference in absolute mean of transfer
(N = 8 sessions averaging over 101 individuals with 0–3 back transfer
decisions each)
Test–Statistic p-value
Mann–Whitney U test Z-value 0.29 0.77
Panel D: Mann–Whitney U test for difference in relative mean of transfer
(N = 8 sessions averaging over 101 individuals with 0–3 back transfer
decisions each, 81 individuals with positive number of back transfer
decisions)
Test–Statistic p-value
Mann–Whitney U test Z-value 0.44 0.66
This table reports results for back transfers from the trust game experiment from
a sample of 101 individuals. Panels A and B report descriptive statistics. Panel C
reports results for the difference in absolute mean back transfer after first averaging
over participants. Panel D reports the corresponding statistics for relative back
transfers. All Z-values are reported for a two-tailed test.
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Each participant was randomly assigned to either a sender
or trustee role in the trust game so we have on average 1.5
observations per participant (see section “Method”). In total, we
have 101 individuals playing X = [0,3] rounds as sender and
3-X rounds as receiver. Senders have 101 × 3 = 153 decisions
and receivers 130 decisions as in 23 decisions by senders did not
send any ECUs. When we aggregate decisions over participants,
we have 87 individuals with strictly positive number of sender
role rounds and 81 individuals with strictly positive number of
receiver role rounds.
We report results for trustworthiness in Figure 2 by
replicating the graph from Kosfeld et al. (2005) for back transfers
from the trustee to the sender. Figure 2 indicates that hungry
individuals send more funds back at all transfer levels (1–4
ECUs). The difference between the hungry and sated conditions
is particularly pronounced in the highest transfers of 3–4 ECUs.
At 3 ECU transfers, the trustees in hungry condition almost
reach payout equality voluntarily sharing the tripled transfer. At
4 ECUs, this tendency levels off slightly.
On all transfer levels in both the hungry and the sated
conditions, trustees on average send back more than what they
were initially sent. They did, however, keep a larger share of the
additional funds to themselves paid by the experiment organizer
consistent with earlier literature (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2005).
In Table 2, we formally report the difference in back transfers
between the hungry control and sated treatment conditions. The
results for both absolute value of back transfers in Panel A
and relative value of back transfers (back transfer/transfer) in
Panel B would hint that hungry individuals act more trustworthy
than sated individuals, indicating a higher-degree of reciprocity
when hungry. On average, a hungry individual sends back 4.17
ECUs compared to 2.89 ECUs by individuals in sated condition.
The mean relative back transfer is 142.58% (median 150%) in
the hungry condition and 109.97% (median 100%) in the sated
condition.
We next average across sessions to account for potential
clustering of observations at the experimental session level in
Panels C and D where we report Mann–Whitney U test Z-values
for the difference between hungry and sated condition. Mann–
Whitney U test Z-statistics on panels C and D are not significant,
which is unsurprising given the sample size (N = 8). If we
assume observations are independent within session but not
within individuals Mann–Whitney test yields Z-statistics of 2.18
(p = 0.03, N = 81) for absolute and 1.65 (p = 0.10, N = 81) for
relative back transfer. Taken together, we fail to the reject null
hypothesis of no effect when first averaging across experimental
sessions. We also cannot rule out the possibility on even having
the wrong sign, and as a result of low power, the reported effect
sizes should be interpret even more cautiously (Gelman and
Carlin, 2014).
We now report in Table 3, results for senders in three rounds
of trust game played by 101 participants with 153 decisions and 87
participants who played at least one round as a sender. The results
in Panel B indicate that individuals in the hungry condition send
more money to the trustee than individuals in the sated condition
(2.56 ECUs in the hungry control versus 2.19 ECUs in the sated
treatment condition). However, the trust game sender decisions
TABLE 3 | Mean transfer for treatment (sated) and control (hungry) groups.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on trust experiment transfer (N = 153
transfer decisions)
Hungry
condition
Sated
condition
Mean of transfer (ECU) 2.56 2.19
Median of transfer (ECU) 2.00 2.00
Standard deviation of transfers (ECU) 1.40 1.38
Number of observations 75 78
Panel B: Mann–Whitney U test for difference in relative mean of transfer
(N = 8 sessions averaging over 101 individuals with 0–3 transfer decisions
each, 87 individuals with positive number of transfer decisions)
Test–Statistic p-value
Mann–Whitney U test Z-value 0.29 0.77
This table reports results for transfers from the trust game experiment from a
sample of 101 individuals. Panel B reports results for the difference in mean
absolute transfer after first averaging over participants. All Z-values are reported
for a two-tailed test.
in Panel B of Table 3 have smaller differences between hungry and
sated condition than receiver results in Table 2 (mean transfer for
hungry condition 2.58 vs. 2.26 for sated condition after averaging
on session level, Z-value of 0.29, p = 0.77, N = 8; Z-value of
1.1, p = 0.27, N = 87 without averaging) and hence do now
allow for robust inference. However, setting the issue of lack of
statistical significance aside for a moment, the difference between
the results for trust game sender and receiver would be in line
with Rand (2016). Receiver plays a game of pure cooperation,
whereas sender plays a game of strategic cooperation. For the
receiver pure cooperation role, short-term hunger matters more,
in line with the argumentation in Rand (2016).
We also investigate in Figure 3 the more granular distribution
of decisions by the sender. The most significant differences in the
decision to send funds to the trustee originate from whether to
send the highest possible value (4 ECUs).
Although fail to reject the null hypothesis for both trusting
and reciprocating when conservatively using experimental
session as the unit of observation, the evidence would not be
inconsistent with the idea that hungry individuals trust more
than sated individuals and the effect magnitude is stronger for
trustworthiness.
Results for Other Games
Results using normalized measures for all games along with
results for the pure cooperation metric are reported in Table 4.
We report all results averaging across individuals to maintain
consistency to results reported published in Rand (2016) and
by relaxing the baseline assumption that observations are not
independent within experimental sessions.
The results in Table 4 would seem to be consistent with the
SHH. Hungry subjects are more cooperative in PD (46% vs. 24%
cooperation, t-value 2.95, p = 0.004) and sending back funds
in the trust game (140% vs. 107% back transfer, t-value 1.84,
p = 0.07). However, the PGG results are at first glance at odds
with the SHH (80% vs. 81% original endowment contribution,
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of transfers to the trustee in the trust game reported separately for treatment (sated) and control (hungry) conditions. N = 153 (Nsated = 78,
Nhungry = 75).
TABLE 4 | Standardized results for all games.
Hungry condition Sated condition N Difference t-stat (2-tailed) p-value
Panel A: Social dilemma
Mean charitable giving 0.45 0.42 101 0.03 0.40 0.69
Panel B: Pure cooperation
Mean prisoner’s dilemma (PD) 0.46 0.24 101 0.22 2.95 0.004
Mean PGG 0.80 0.81 101 − 0.01 − 0.017 0.92
Mean trust game receiver (TGP2) 1.40 1.07 81 0.33 1.84 0.07
Pure cooperation [(PD, PGG, TGP2) as in Rand, 2016 0.65 0.55 101 0.11 2.08 0.04
Panel C: Strategic cooperation
Mean trust game sender (TGP1) 0.64 0.56 87 0.08 1.11 0.27
Panel A reports aggregated results for two charitable giving decisions (Red Cross Disaster Relief Fund and New Children’s hospital), Panel B for decisions involving pure
cooperation (see e.g., Rand, 2016), and Panel C a decision of strategic cooperation (trust game sender). Pure cooperation metric (reported in Figure 2 of Rand, 2016)
combines individual decisions from prisoner’s dilemma, public good game, and trust game receiver role. All statistics are aggregated on individual level from three rounds
of games in laboratory. All results are standardized. In Panel A, 1 indicates full contribution of endowment. In Panel B, 1 indicates cooperation in Prisoner’s dilemma (0 for
defect), 1 full endowment contribution in public good game (0 for zero contribution), 1 sending back original endowment (before multiplication, 0 for sending back nothing)
in trust game. In Panel C, 1 indicates sending full endowment in the trust game.
t = –0.11, p = 0.92). The large base rates in the PGG may
bear the answer: a highly-automated decision with low cognitive
conflict will show up with extreme responses (either close to
0 or 1) and such decisions would be least prone to cognitive
load manipulation, such as hunger. This interpretation would be
consistent with the models in Bear and Rand (2016) and Bear
et al. (2017) in which an agent will switch between intuitive
and deliberative responses depending on the deliberation cost
threshold, T. The dominant strategy (e.g., intuitively defecting
or intuitively coordinating) is a function of the probability of
the coordination by the other player in the model of Bear
et al. (2017). The closer this probability is to 1, the more likely
that intuitively coordinating is a good strategy for reasonable
other parameter estimates in the model. Alternatively, subjects
could have misunderstood the PGG which would explain the
failure to reject null in favor of the SHH. This second potential
explanation would be consistent with Strømland et al. (2016) who
reanalyze evidence on SHH and conclude that participant failure
to understand PGG reconciles some conflicting evidence in the
literature.
For charitable giving we find similarly no difference between
the hungry vs. sated condition (45% vs. 42% charitable giving,
t-value 0.40, p = 0.69). Failing to reject null for altruism is
consistent with Hauge et al. (2016) and Tinghög et al. (2016)
who do not find evidence on cognitive load having an impact
on altruism in experimental settings similar to ours. The results
would also line up with Kessler and Meier (2014) who suggest
that cognitive load may be differently effective early and late in a
session for charitable giving decisions—the charitable giving was
last decision of each round in our laboratory session. However, all
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TABLE 5 | Hidden experiment for trusting behavior.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Hungry
condition
Sated
condition
% leaving personal belongings including
valuables
20% 4%
Standard deviation of transfers (incl. valuables) 0.41 0.19
% leaving personal belongings excluding
valuables
37% 13%
Standard deviation of transfers (excl. valuables) 0.49 0.34
Number of observations 49 52
Panel B: OLS-regression results for personal belongings including
valuables
Coefficient for sated condition –0.17
p-value, wild cluster bootstrapping at session
level
0.35
p-value, standard errors not clustered 0.01
R2 0.065
Number of observations 101
Panel C: OLS-regression results for personal belongings excluding
valuables
Coefficient for sated condition –0.23
p-value, wild cluster bootstrapping at session
level
0.14
p-value, standard errors not clustered 0.01
R2 0.073
Number of observations 101
Individuals were surveyed at the end of the experimental session on whether they
left their personal belongings in the first laboratory room while participating in the
game session in the second laboratory room. Panel A shows descriptive statistics
for leaving belongings in the first laboratory room. Panel B reports results from
individual decision to leave any belongings (including valuables) using a univariate
OLS-regression with wild cluster bootstrapping of standard errors at session
level (1000 replications). Panel C reports results from individual decision to leave
personal belongings excluding valuables similar to Panel B. Number of clusters in
Panels B and C is 8.
of these interpretations for the games other than the trust game
must be taken with extreme caution as we did not hypothesize on
these games ex ante.
Hidden Experiment for Short-Term
Hunger and Trust in the Laboratory
Method
This analysis was carried out with the same sample of
respondents (N = 101) as the trust game. Before participants left
the first laboratory room with blood glucose tests and surveys
behind them, they were given the choice to either leave their
belongings in the first laboratory room or take their belongings
with them to the second laboratory room. We report results for
this hidden experiment in Table 5.
Results and Discussion
Results in Panel A of Table 5 corroborate our findings for
trust in Table 3: individuals who were in the hungry condition
are more likely to leave their belongings (indicated by self-
reported to a short survey at the end of laboratory session, see
end of section “Method”) behind than individuals in the sated
condition. In the hungry condition, 20% left their valuables and
37% any items (including large non-valuable items such as jackets
and bags) in the first laboratory room. In the sated condition
the corresponding values are 4% for valuables and 13% for all
items.
We estimate a parsimonious OLS regression with the binary
decision to leave belongings in the first laboratory room in LHS
and with a dummy for sated condition and an intercept in
the RHS using wild cluster bootstraps (Cameron et al., 2008)
with 8 clusters and 1000 iterations. As reported in Panels B
and C, the coefficient for the differences between the hungry
control and the sated treatment condition are not statistically
significant (coefficient –0.17, p = 0.35) for all belongings
and for belongings after excluding valuables (coefficient –0,23,
p = 0.14). When we do not cluster standard errors at session
level, difference between hungry and sated group is statistically
significant (p= 0.01) for all belongings and belongings excluding
valuables. However, to be on the conservative side of the
interpretation, we cannot reject the null hypothesis in our
analysis.
CONCLUSION
We develop three alternative hypotheses in this paper as why
hunger may have an impact on trust. The overall empirical
evidence in this paper is, however, inconclusive: we fail
to identify an effect when using conservative clustering of
standard errors at session level. When we assume independent
decisions within experimental sessions, the results would be
broadly consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis (Bear
and Rand, 2016; Bear et al., 2017) and the view that both
trust and being trustworthy are automated, default-choice
responses in our sample operating in a society where fair
division of resources and interpersonal trust are strong social
norms.
As we had only a limited number of subjects in our study,
an obvious next step would be to redo the analysis using a
larger sample and number of experimental sessions, perhaps
in a context when not trusting and reciprocating is the norm.
In addition, we also have limited understanding the impact of
other visceral factors in mediating trust. Thirst, which were
controlled for5 but not the focus of the present study, would
be a prime candidate for an analysis of trust similar to this
study. We also had one treatment and one control condition
in the laboratory. It would be a natural next step to investigate
behavioral responses of individuals in more sharply identified
categories of satiety. A study using light meal and ad libitum
meal manipulations, compared with a control group, could shed
5As described in Appendix A, we provide water ad libitum to ensure participants
are not thirsty. All experimental sessions were scheduled to start at the same time
to control for systematic diurnal patterns in fatigue across treatment and control
conditions.
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light on how important the amount of energy intake on trust and
reciprocity is.
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